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Robert Crandallt
The unsuspecting purchaser of Robert Leone's Who Profits: Winners,
Losers, and Government Regulation' (without a question mark) might
think he is going to glean some new estimates or theory of the distribution
of gains from government regulation. How much does regulation cartelize
industry or labor?2 How much does regulation protect domestic industry
from foreign competition? Or established firms from new competititors?
Do consumers gain at the expense of business, or vice versa? Are the in-
terests of consumers, businessmen, and regulators to some extent identical,
and if not, at what point do these interests diverge, and why? In terms of
both efficiency and fairness, whose interests are considered the touchstone
for evaluation of any given regulatory change?
Surprisingly, Leone answers none of these questions. This book is not
an attempt to measure "who profits," but is instead a short handbook to
help private decisionmakers and public policymakers cope with the fact
* Lecturer in Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; former
Senior Economist for the President's Council of Economic Advisers (1980-1981).
t Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution. The author thanks Eva Saks for her helpful advice
and editorial suggestions.
1. R. LEONE, WHO PROFITS: WINNERS, LOSERS, AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION (1985) (here-
inafter by page number].
2. The "capture" theory of regulation, which suggests that regulatory agencies do not remain
independent but instead are captured by special interest groups and then reinforce this cartelization,
has been prominent in the economics literature since the 1960's. For a review of the literature, see B.
MITNICK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION 206-39 (1980); Joskow & Noll, Regulation
in Theory and Practice: An Overview, in STUDIES IN PUBLIC REGULATION (G. Fromm ed. 1981).
See also infra text accompanying notes 10-15.
3. An early analysis of regulation as a barrier to entry in competitive markets is contained in
Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, J.L. & ECON. 93-117 (1961). More recently, important work in
this area includes R. NOLL & B. OWEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEREGULATION: INTEREST
GROUPS IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS (1983).
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that government policies create winners and losers. It is, in short, a "how-
to" guide for players in the game that Public Choice theory might call
"the private use of the public interest." Leone's book neither adds to nor
expands upon the theory of public choice or rent-seeking behavior; his
book is rather a product of such behavior. In its structure, organization,
and content, Who Profits avoids the general economic and political impli-
cations of regulatory policies.
I. The "Iron Law" of Public Policy
Leone's message is rather straightforward. There is an Iron Law of
Public Policy: Any regulatory policy, however socially beneficial or waste-
ful, creates winners and losers." It is important for businessmen to recog-
nize this fact and to adapt themselves in a fashion that assures they are not
the losers. Similarly, policymakers must also recognize the Iron Law and
the way businesses adapt to it if they are to design and execute policies
that serve the public interest.
The book is divided into two sections: (1) Understanding Competition
When Government Matters5 and (2) Understanding Government When
Competition Matters.' The first section might be part of a casebook for a
business school course on government regulation of business. The second
begins as a business school course in business strategy and concludes as a
primer for a public policy school course. Leone, formerly Senior Econo-
mist for the President's Council of Economic Advisors and currently a
lecturer at Harvard, has undoubtedly taught all three courses, on both
sides of the Charles River.
Had Leone treated the problem of regulation with equal respect for the
short and long term concerns of businessmen, policymakers, and the pub-
lic in general, he might have illuminated some of the trade-offs and
choices implicit in any regulatory policy. However, his project is to offer
strategic suggestions to private businessmen and policymakers. This limits
his concerns to the tactical and his perspective to the technical. Despite
Leone's claims of objectivity and lack of "ideology," 7 he seems to endorse
the outcome of these regulatory games between businessmen and
bureaucrats.
The first section begins with an admonition to ideologues. According to





Vol. 4: 495, 1987
Regulatory Game
essence of government regulation." Conservatives generally do not under-
stand the potential benefits of regulation; liberals simply want to control
business without considering the complex, long-run effects of such policies
on the economy. In the next chapter, 9 we are given another reason for
eschewing ideology: Regulation is inevitable and pervasive. We had better
understand its intricacies and learn to adapt to it rather than fighting it or
promoting regulation as an end in itself. This might seem a strangely
stoical perspective on government from a former policymaker, but it does
have the virtue of allowing Leone to avoid the complex Public Choice
issues that would arise should he attempt anything other than a tactical
approach.
Little is original in this first section. Certainly, readers of Kolko,' °
Downs,11 Olson, 2 Buchanan,' 8 Peltzman,' 4 Stigler,"5 and analysts of reg-
ulation know that private firms can and do reap substantial rents from
government policy. Much of the earlier literature on government regula-
tion concluded that regulatory commissions often cartelized sellers who
would otherwise be subject to competition and threats of new entry. Le-
one's emphasis in this section, however, is on the newer forms of regula-
tion: environmental,' health and safety,'7 and mandated fuel efficiency. 8
Unfortunately, he does not attempt to enhance our understanding of these
newer forms by analyzing them in light of the earlier theory. In particu-
lar, it would have been interesting for Leone to have tested the implica-
tions of the early Public Choice Theory. As a predictive matter, are these
newer regulatory policies consistent with the earlier paradigm's descrip-
tion of the interplay of government and interest groups? Can the insights
of these classic papers be easily extended to the newer forms of regula-
tion? Or do the newer regulatory forms reflect changes in the regulatory
game that demand extensive revision or reconsideration of these early
insights?
My own impression is that the growth of the new social regulation only
partially reflects the interaction of narrow private interest groups, but that
8. Pp. 7-15.
9. Pp. 22-29.
10. G. KOI.KO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION: 1877-1916 (1965).
11. A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).
12. M. OLSON, THE LOCI: OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
13. J. BUCHANAN, R. TOLI.SON & G. TULLOCK, TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING
SOCIETY (1980).
14. Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976).
15. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sct. 3 (1971).
16. E.g., pp. 189-93 (discussing Best Conventional Technology criterion for industrial control of
water pollutants).
17. E.g., pp. 52-53 (discussing Consumer Product Safety Commission establishment of safety
standards for chainsaws).
18. Pp. 36-37, 41-42, 96-105, 223-25.
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such groups as organized labor and declining industries have succeeded in
influencing the direction of these policies. The wellspring of this regula-
tion, however, would appear to be an emotional, neopopulist, anti-
business movement that arose in the United States in an era when the
U.S. economy was growing much more rapidly. As growth has slowed,
the regulatory games that Leone describes have impinged more noticeably
on our standard of living.
Leone's project is more modest. He weaves a series of "stories" about
individual regulatory episodes into a set of lessons for decision-makers.
These anecdotes are drawn preponderantly from water pollution19 and
automobile regulation,"° two areas in which Leone has a great deal of
experience as both a scholar and a technocrat. Given his background, one
might have expected that his methodology would be to suggest approaches
that would mitigate the damage created by the regulatory game. However,
his approach is descriptive: Leone utilizes these episodic examples as il-
lustrations of the government's effect upon the cost structure of firms, 1
the level of industry capacity,2 and the level of final demand for an indus-
try's product."3
After giving us his insights on how government matters in a competitive
environment, Leone then turns to a set of lectures for businessmen and
public policy managers. Businesses are given insights into how they might
use government's interventions for their own advantage. ' Public policy
managers are given "guidelines for action" that allow them to navigate the
shoals of enlightened self-interest of businessmen.2 Both sides are warned
against naive responses to the other, and are cautioned to consider the
long-run implications of their answers.
II. A Technical Critique
Most of Leone's analysis in the first section of the book is straightfor-
ward applied microeconomics with which this reviewer is in agreement.
One can quibble with some of the cases-for example, his discussion of
airbags for automobiles.26 He concludes that automobile producers have
19. E.g., pp. 194-96 (discussing how producers might deal with the "creeping incrementalism" of
Environmental Protection Agency water pollution standards).
20. E.g., pp. 65-66 (discussing potential impact of passive restraint rules on variability of costs in
auto industry).
21. E.g., pp. 55-57 (water pollution regulation raises fixed costs of paper industry).
22. E.g., pp. 72-78 (impact of regulation-created retrofit costs on capacity).
23. E.g., pp. 92-94 (regulation as factor influencing firms' product line decisions).
24. E.g., p. 166 (businessmen should "look for ways to use government regulation as a competi-
tive weapon").
25. E.g., p.188 (government managers should take steps to avoid "methodological capture" of
agency decision-making by both business and government colleagues).
26. Pp. 68-69.
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fought the requirement for airbags because such a policy would have re-
duced the demand for new automobiles even though it would reduce the
net private cost of vehicle ownership." Why would a lower net cost of
owning and operating a new vehicle (as opposed to continued use of an
older non-airbag car) lead to lower demand for new cars?
Elsewhere, Leone's discussion of the Big Three automobile producers'
response to mandated fuel economy standards is unsatisfying. Ford's strat-
egy to downsize compact and intermediate classes of automobiles"8 failed
because Ford seemed to be unwilling or unable to move new designs in
the market immediately after 1977-1978. A change in management in the
1980's seems to have been responsible for the recent rejuvenation of Ford,
a fact Leone neglects altogether. And his discussion of Chrysler's strat-
egy29 also suffers from his failure to follow through to the 1980's, for by
1985 Chrysler was the only major producer apparently in favor of contin-
uing the government's mandated Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFE) standards. Ford and General Motors, though, did not come out
against CAFE despite their difficulties in meeting the standards in 1983-
1985. Why? Perhaps their concern was a tactical one-a Michigan Con-
gressman was the author of the original legislation, and the vehicle com-
panies could not risk offending him. Moreover, CAFE is more of a prob-
lem for European producers of expensive cars than for U.S. producers. It
therefore acts as an informal trade barrier.
Leone's discussion of the different Big Three automobile company posi-
tions on the import quotas on automobiles from Japan8" is more persua-
sive. General Motors was not disposed to support this policy because it
would encourage the Japanese to upgrade their import mix and therefore
compete directly with General Motors' mix. He also points out that the
quotas accelerated the pace of Japanese direct investment in U.S. produc-
tive capacity, 1 but fails to tell us why this investment is more adverse to
General Motors than to other U.S. producers.
This first section of the book should convince the lay reader that gov-
ernment can and does affect market competition. The professional econo-
mist will not be startled by this conclusion. The scholar searching for new
estimates of how much private interests gain from regulation, however,
will be disappointed. Leone has not added to our knowledge of the direct
and indirect costs or benefits of regulation, nor of the rents appropriated
by labor, capital, or management. He has only shown the lay reader that
27. P. 69.
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these rents are available. Nor has he offered new insights into the eco-
nomic effects of regulation. It would have been interesting to get Leone's
prescriptions for improving regulatory policy, but he does not offer us this
public policy insight.
As a stylistic matter, Leone's book is readable and clearly organized.
However, its style is obviously for the lay reader, not for the professional.
III. A More Fundamental Objection
It is with the last part of the book that this reviewer has the greatest
difficulty. First, Leone advises businessmen to recognize the effects of reg-
ulation on competition and to adapt and even shape these regulatory poli-
cies for their own profit. The private strategies for dealing with govern-
ment border on the obvious. Do not attempt the blustering approach. 2
Rather, plan to use and lobby for government policies in a manner consis-
tent with your own self-interest. 8 Leone uses material from a Harvard
Business School case study on a petroleum refinery built during this coun-
try's regulatory madness towards oil prices and imports.' He concludes
from this exercise that a firm can cope with and profit from even this
absurd form of regulation. 5 This conclusion raises two questions. First,
the reader might ask if he should be reassured or appalled by it. Second, if
any given regulation profits someone, what is Leone's standard for distin-
guishing welfare-enhancing regulation from wasteful regulation? Further-
more, if the firm Leone discusses has profited from the regulation in ques-
tion, doesn't Leone's own Iron Law demand that some firm he has
omitted from his discussioi. has lost? Does Leone mean to suggest that he
believes any given firm can "win" at any time, or that in the long run
each firm will have its turn as a winner? Moreover, are there no other
players besides businesses and government in this game?
Leone, the technocrat, then advises his successors in government to
eschew technocracy and to pursue an avowedly political strategy of pro-
moting the public welfare by recognizing that businessmen will try to in-
fluence policy and at least adapt to it." But what is the policymaker's
goal-his "objective function" in the parlance of theory?
These dual prescriptions leave this reviewer a bit puzzled. What is
Leone's implicit model of this regulatory game? If Player A (the business-
man) recognizes that Player B (the policymaker/technocrat) will adapt to
32. The "naive response" to regulation and its characteristics are described by Leone at pp. 134-
45.
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his response, will A not adjust to B's "reaction function"? And won't B
then react to A's reaction function? What are the equilibrium properties
of this game? Of course, without a coherent theoretical model or policy
agenda, there is no reason to expect any equilibrium. Still, one wonders
whether there are organizational factors that would make it easier for one
side to adjust more rapidly than the other. Are there more constraints on
corporate decision-making and discretion than on its bureaucratic oppo-
site? Certainly corporate decision-makers have more discretion in many
areas. On the other hand, they may be in some instances more personally
accountable for the results of their choices than bureaucrats; they may be
more likely to bear the costs as well as the benefits of their professional
strategies. Unfortunately, Leone does not compare the bureaucratic hier-
archy to the corporate, except to note that bureaucratic decisions are made
in a "bottom up" authority hierarchy, while corporate decisions are "top
down."'87 But what implications does this discrepancy have for the strate-
gies Leone offers? Again, it would be problematic if both sides tried to
adjust simultaneously to this discrepancy, once again creating the dise-
quilibrium dynamic described above.
Leone leaves us with the uncomfortable feeling that he thinks everyone
can "win." 88 As long as the businessman recognizes the game, he can
adapt and even influence the regulatory outcome. But doesn't he always
win at the expense of some other businessman? In short, Leone never tells
us what happens if all competitors and policymakers read this book. As a
matter of logic, Leone's book would have been most valuable not only if
he had offered tips to one side only-to business, probably-but also if he
had printed only one copy, and sold it to one businessman.
The reader might wish to contrast this book with Schultze's The Public
Use of Private Interest8 or White's Reforming Regulation." Schultze's
book suggests how policymakers can harness private incentives to achieve
social goals. White's book gives us a wealth of well-documented examples
of how regulatory decisions are actually made. Schultze offers the solution
for a number of the real-world follies of government that White uncovers.
Both Schultze's and White's books are extremely useful for the public-
spirited policymaker. It is unclear whether Leone's real audience is the
public-spirited policymaker, the public-spirited businessman, or the
private-spirited businessman. My impression is that his real topic is the
private use of the public interest, the concern of Public Choice literature.
37. Pp. 123-25.
38. Leone advises the astute industrialist, when faced with government regulation, to "be a
winner." This is part of Leone's "sophisticated response."
39. C. SCHui.TZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST (1977).
40. L. WHITE, REFORMING REGULATION: PROCESSES AND PROBLEMS (1981).
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He must then confront that branch of the literature with decidedly un-
pleasant implications: the theory of rent-seeking behavior. Only by com-
bining the lessons of Schultze and White with the insights of the Public
Choice literature could Leone offer the reader a "regulatory game" that
would truly be worth the candle.
